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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

rl1 HE STATE OF UTAH

'

PL,AINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

vs.

Case No.

WELDON BASSETT AND

12727

JUDY BASSETT,
DIDFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a criminal action charging the defendants
and each of them with Involuntary Manslaughter for the
death of their minor child.
DISPOSITION IN Lff\VER COURT
The Jury found both defendants guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal of the Jury verdict of
guilty of Manslaughter as a matter of law and fact or
that failing, remanding the case to the District Court
for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Weldon and Judy Bassett are the parents of Erica
Jean Bassett, who was approximately fifteen months
old at the time of death. Prior to birth and during the
fame Erica was alive Judy Bassett was industrially and
legally blind with visual acuity of less than twenty-four
hundred with complaints of double vision and distortion; her depth of perception bad. (Tr 137, lines 23
through 30; Tr 138, lines 1 through 27; Tr 139, lines I
through 30; and Tr. 140, lines 1through19; Tr 142, line's
15 through 20.) Judy subsequently received a corneal
transplant to one eye with another to be performed on
the other eye.
On September 11, 1970, defendant Judy Bassett
gave birth to the daughter, Erica Jean Bassett, at the
St. Benedict's Hospital in Ogden, Utah. The birth was
a breach birth, with the fanny coming first and the body
doubled and bent. A breach birth is not normal and it
is not uncommon for a child to be injured during such
birth with broken bones and head injuries. (Tr 10, lines
5 through 30; Tr 11, lines 1 through 30; Tr 30; lines 19
through 30; and Tr 31, lines 1 through 36.).
Dr. Rogers was the doctor in attendance at the time
of said birth, and had been the Bassetts' doctor since the
time of the birth of their son, prior to the birth of Erica,
and stated he had never had any reson to believe the
defendants had ever abused their older son or Ericathat they seemed to be loving and devoted parents during all the time he knew them. They seemed to be kind
and solicitous parents. (Tr 43, lines 10 through 30.)
All who knew Weldon and Judy Bassett testified that
2

they seemed to love children very much and could not
mistreat their own children-Weldon's mother (Tr 217,
lines 11 through 20.); his brother Earl Dean (Tr 230,
lines 8 through 16; Tr. 236, lines 1 through 6) his sister
1\lary Jean (Tr. 243 lines 9 through 30; Tr. 245 lines 11
through 27; Tr. 256 lines 16 through 18); Judy's father,
Newton Glen (11 r. 258; lines 12 through 29.): her brother,
Ronald J. (Tr. 263, lines 14 through 19).
Evidence showed that ever

since birth the child

seemed to be in constant great pain, cried a great deal
and did not seem to be a normal happy, healthy child, (Tr
153, lines 2 through 27; Tr 173, lines 5 through 15; Tr
177, lines 1 through 30; Tr 219, lines 3 through 19; Tr
233, lines 5 through 17 ; Tr 246, lines 2 through 24; Tr
264, lines 7 through 22.) This would seem to show
Erica had received painful and serious injuries at birth.
On November 8th, 1970, Erica was taken to the
McKay-Dee Hospital where she was suffering from convulsions and mild fever. (Tr 14, lines 6 through 30; Tr
15, lines 1 through 30; Tr 16, lines 1 through 30.) Dr.
Rogers examined the child, had a brain and spinal tap
performed and found tra0es of blood from the brain and
spinal tap, but indicated that such might have resulted
from the physical action of taking such a tap. (Tr 17,
lines 5 through 30; Tr 18, lines 1 through 6; and Tr 20,
lines 6 through 25.) The child was subsequently released from the hospital after no emergency care and ac3

cording to the Doctor in excellent health. (Tr 22, lines
25 through 30; Tr 23, lines 1 through 27.) On November 24, 1970, the child was taken to the St. Benedict's
Hospital where it was pronounced dead, with no visible
evidence of any injurie,s or bruises. (Tr 25, lines 5
through 30.) The father, Weldon Bassett, willingly
consented to an autopsy, or at least attempted so to do.
(Tr 168, lines 19 through 28.) An autopsy was in fact
performed where it was found that the child, Erica, had
died from acute and chronic subdural hematoma no
skull fractures or bruises on head was ever found. (Tr
78, lines 3 through 9.)
The defendant Weldon Bassett was accused of the
crime of Involuntary Manslaughter in one action, and
the defendant Judy Bassett was also accused of Involuntary Manslaughter in another cause, which said causes
were then joined and tried together. The case was tried
before 'the Trial Court. The defendants moved for a
dismissal at the conclusion of the State's case, which
Motion was denied; defendants submitted testimony and
the matter was placed in the hands of the jury, which
returned a verdict of guilty for both defendants. (Tr
269, lines 28 through 30; and Tr 220, lines 1 through 5.)
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE STATE'S CASE AGAINST BOTH
DEFENDANTS AT 'THE, CONCLUSION OF THE
STATE'S EVIDENCE.
At the conclusion of the State's case, defendants
moved the Court for an Order dismissing the complaints
4

against each of them for Involuntary Manslaughter,
which Motion was denied by said Trial Court. Defendants contend that this denial was in error. At the conclusion of the State's case the only evidence adduced
was that the defendants Weldon and Judy Bassett were
the parents of one Erica Bassett; that Erica subsequently died on November 24th, 1970, being approximately
two and one-ha:lf months old. The State further showed
that Erica had insignificant brui:ses upon her arms and
body, the only injuries visible to the eye, but upon completion of an autopsy Erica was found to have had
broken ribs and subdural hematoma. Nothing more was
introduced by the State to show that either Weldon or
Judy had committed any act causing the injuries resulting in the death of Erica. As a matter of fact, the State's
witness, Dr. Rogers, indicated that he had known the defendants since the birth of their first child; that at all
times the defendants had shown love and affection for
not only Erica but for their older child and that he had
no reason to suspect or believe that either of them had
ever abused Erica or their older son and that they seemed to be loving and devoted parents.
The State's evidence aliso indicated that brain taps
had been performed on the child, which could have caused
subdural hematoma; that the child Erica was born
breach which could have resulted in broken bones and
'
head injuries;
that there are many and various reasons
for subdural hematoma: falling from bed or couch,
blow, shaking, accidental blow, veins severed by brain
tap and many other reasons, with only evidence being
that of a spinal tap, Judy accidentally bumping baby's
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head on crib and Erica's bro,ther playing roughly around
her with toy wheels, and this is all. The State had failed to show that either Judy or Weldon Bassett ever
struck Erica or had ever abused her in any way. There
wa:s no visible evidence of a blow to her head. There
was no act nor intent offered into evidence by the State
as defined in our Statute, Tile 76-1-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Even ,assuming all of the evidence to be
true and held most strongly as against the defendants,
there is absolutely no such evidence to submit the case
to the Jury and the trial Court should have dismissed the
action as against Judy 'and Weldon Bassett; the Court
erred in refusing to dismiss.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY RENDERED BY THE JURY
AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
This action was originally filed in two separate
causes by the State of Uta:h, charging each of the defendants singularly with the commission of the crime
of Involuntary Manslaughter as defined by our Statute
76-30-5, Utah Code Annotated 1963, a pertinent part
which is set forth as follows :
"(2) Involuntary in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or in the
commission of a lawful act which might produce
death in an unlawful manner or Without due caution and circumspection."
A careful review of the transcript of the trial pro6

ceedings nowhere reflects any act or omission of either
of the defendants which could convict under our Statute.
To the contrary, from the teS'timony of the child's doctor, Dr. Rogers, the Bassetts seem to be kind and solicitous parents, very much interested in the welfare of
Erica Jean and their other child, with no evidence or
hint at all of any propensity toward abuse. Tihere is
absolutely no other evidence of any act or omission as
required by the Statute. Without exception all witnesses who knew both Weldon and Judy Bassett stated that
both of them seemed to love this child and their other
child very greatly, was always with them, was always
showing them attention and were concerned with the welfare of E,rica. There is no evidence of a pattern of child
abuse-drinking or temper tantrums that is almost universally present in almost every child abuse case.
On one instance the defendant, Weldon Bassett,
stated that the child Erica had a bump on her head when
the defendant, Judy Bassett, who was for all purposes
legally blind, attempted to lift Erica from the bed to
place her in the crib, which was adjacent to the bed. This
is the only evidence that either of the defendants ever
did anything to hurt Erica and this is certainly not an
act as contemplated by the Statute. It is an unfortunate
accident resulting from a condition beyond the control
of either of the defendants.
Another aspect of this case, apparently ignored by
the Jury, was the fact that the testimony of Weldon Bassett and a number of witnesses who knew Erica from her
birth indicated tha,t something seemed to be wrong with
her, that she seemed to be in constant terrible pain and
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cried in a manner not consistent with the normal child
would certainly indicate that there is some
hon as to Erica's being rather seriously injured at birth.
The State's expert witness, Dr. Rogers, and the testimony of the pathologist was in part completely contradictory. Dr. Rogers stated they found no evidence
of injury to Erica at any time, but the pathologist stated
that the ribs were broken possibly as far back as birth.
Either Dr. Rogers did not examine carefully or he missed these injuries. The same is true with respect to the
hematoma.
The child's doctor, Dr. Rogers, testified that Erica
was born breach, in other words, fanny first. The Doctor further testified that it is not uncommon for bones
to be broken and injuries to occur in such a breach birth.
This would seem to be consistant with the evidence that
Erica was in considerable pain from the birth on and
could account for many of the injuries as determined by
the autopsy. It would be further entirely consistent
that in the handling of ETica these injuries that could
have been caused at birth would be aggravated even
with normal handling and would cause the chronic, painful crying. It should be noted further, that with respect
to the injuries to the brain, ·such could have occurred
when the child's head was bumped against the crib 01
possibly bumped by accident on any other occasion. Dr.
Weston stated babies of this age have been known to
roll over and fall, causing such brain damage and death.
Defendants' minor son squeezed Erica and threw
his toy made out of wheels around the home, which could
have struck and injured Erica. It was futher testified
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to that two brain taps were performed on Erica at the
time she was first taken into the hospital for examination, and that it is possible that injuries could have occurred by the needle passing into the skull into the area
between the skull and the brain itself, which could puncture veins and cause bleeding. The bruises testified to
by Dr. Rogers were all indicated to be minimal and normal bruises which you would probably find on a
youngster that size and age, and none contributed
to the baby' s death.
1

Once again defendants respectifully submit that
there is absolutely no evidence in the record at all showing any act of any specific nature by either of the defendents upon which to base a finding of guilty. The defe:ndant, Weldon Bassett, was not shown to have committed any act whatsoever, accidentally or otherwise.
The defendant, Judy Bassett, accidentally bumped the
child's head in an attempt to place the child in its crib.
The defendants respectfully submit that the Jury disregarded the evidence and instructions and based their
verdict solely upon bia sed prejudice or in the heat of
pass10n.
POINT III
1

1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 8, SETTING OUT THE ELEMENTS
TO BE FOUND BY THE JURY TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANTS OF THE CRIME OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.
The Appellants and Defendants objected to the
Court giving Instruction Number 8 at the conference of
the Trial .Judge and counsel, prior to the giving of the
9

and exception was taken to the said instruction after the instructions were given to the Jury. Instruction objected to is as follows:
"No. 8
Before you can convince the defendant of the
crime ·of Involuntary Manslaughter you must find
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt
'
all of the following elements of that crime.
1. Tlmt Erica Bassett was the lawful child of
the defendant under consideration and as such
the defendant was under an obligation to provide
ordinary protection. The protection that a parent must provide need not be of exceptional or
extra careful or unusually wise type of protection,
but need only be in accordance with community
minimal acceptable standards.
2. That Erica Bassett died as a result of head
injuries caused by trauma and that the trauma
was administered while there existed a child-parent relationship with the defendant under consideration on or about the date alleged.
3. That the parent under consideration failed
to provide minimal protection for the child and
because of such failure the child received the
trauma that resulted in its death. A parent is not
a guarantor of the safety of a child but is required
to use ordinary reasonable care. The criminal
law does not punish a parent for negligent care
of a child unless that negligence is so gross as to
amount to a wilful disregard for the consequences
and it must be under circumstances containing no
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satisfactory excuse. While a parent may under
many circumstances reasonably trust the other
parent to provide> protection, neither parent may
totally
the duty to the other unless the circircumstances appear to warrant such confidence.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each
and all of the essential elements of the offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of
said elements then you should find the defendant
not guilty."

The Statute under which the defendants are charged is as follows: Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
76-30-5 Manslaughter defined - Manslaughter is
the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. It is of two kinds: (1) (Not applicable)
(2) Involuntary in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or in the
of a lawful act which might produce
death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection.
The defendants requested the court to give an instruction based upon this definition but the Court refused to do so.
The Instruction that was given does not reflect the
wordinO'
b nor the intent under which the defendants and
each of them were charged. There is no mention of the
requirement to find that the defendants committed an un11

lawful act not amounting to a felony, nor that the defendants eommitted a

act which might prod;;

death in an unlawful manner or without due caution
and circumspection. The Statute clearly requires one
of these elements to fall within the purview of such Manslaughter Statute. An extensive search of the cases decided by this Court, based upon the Statute in question,
reveals nowhere any authority for the type of Instruction that was given. State v Lancaster, 20 U (2d) 80,
433 B2d 312 et seq: Most of the other cases cited by the
Supreme Court were involved with automobile homicide.
This Instruction further was improper under the
circumstances because there was no evidence of negligence on the part of either of the defendants upon which
to base the Instruction. A careful review of the transcript reveals no evidence of any negligence whatsoever.
Another reason that said Instruction was improper was
the fact that the Court did not instruct the Jury that any
trauma which might have caused the death must have
been administered by either one or both of the said defendants, and under paragraph two (2) of said Instructions merely indicated that if the trauma was administered while there existed a child-parent relationship with
the defendants, this would be sufficient. We submit that
under our Statute the trauma must have been administered by either one or the other or both of the said defendants to convict either or both of the said offense. The
Instruction as given was prejudicial for the above reasons and does not reflect the necessary and essential elements of the crime in order to convict.
12

CONCLUSION
Defendants and each of them represent that the
conviction of both of them of the crime of Involuntary
Manslaughter was not supported by the facts or by the
law, and that errors committed during the time of the
trial were prejudicial. There was never shown any act
or intent as is required by our 'Statutes and Court dec1s10ns. There was never shown any neglect even to
support a conviction under the improper Instruction
Number 8. The case did in fact involve a fact situation
which would tend to give rise to a great deal of sympathy
and pa:ssion, which they submit did in fact influence the
Jury and did result in the conviction.
We further respectfully submit that it is not incumbent upon the defendants to prove themselves innocent, it is incumbent upon the State to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt which they submit was not
done in this matter.
Defendants conclude that based upon the law and
facts produced in this case the Jury's decision should
be reversed and the defendants and each of them found
not guilty, or this failing, remanding this case to the
lower Court for a n%3 trial.
Dated this ;gg____-;-__ day of December, 1971.
BY,

02---• -.

I, GORD
HUGGINS
ATTORNE1 FOR APPELLANTS
First Security Bank Building,
Suite 1101-09
Ogden, Utah
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